University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

January 2012

The Homegrown Jihad: A Comparative Study of
Youth Radicalization in the United States and
Europe
William Wolfberg
University of South Florida, wwolfberg@mail.usf.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Wolfberg, William, "The Homegrown Jihad: A Comparative Study of Youth Radicalization in the United States and Europe" (2012).
Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4421

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Homegrown Jihad:
A Comparative Study of Youth Radicalization in the
United States and Europe

by

William Seth Wolfberg

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Political Science, Government & Intl Affairs
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Abdelwahab Hechiche, Ph.D.
Harry E. Vanden, Ph.D.
Steven Roach, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
October 29, 2012

Keywords: National Security, Global Terrorism, Threat Analysis, Population Studies,
Islamic Extremists
Copyright © 2012, William Seth Wolfberg

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my beloved, Veronica, who has supported me throughout
the years and long nights, both mentally and emotionally, and has always been there to
lift my spirits during my lowest points. I could not have done this without you.
I would like to thank my family specifically Mom, Dad, Zach, Keegan, Mark,
Mamaw, Grandma Joannie, and Grandpa Marty. Also, I would like to thank Aunt
Florence and Pops. Though you are no longer with us, your support and wisdom was
pivotal to my life and my development from childhood to adulthood. I would like to
thank my best friend and battle brother and sister 2nd Lt. Mohammed and Staff Sgt.
Soondos Rashied for offering me an escape from the long hours of research and always
being there when I needed you the most.

هللا يسلمكم
This thesis and this degree are dedicated to you all.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge and thank the faculty of the Department of
Government & Intl Affairs for their support and wisdom they have provided throughout
the years. Specifically, I would like to thank the support of Professor Abdelwahab
Hechiche for the knowledge, support, and trust he has bestowed upon me as a student. I
would also like to thank Dr. Steven Roach for opening my eyes to the world of
international relations and providing me with a firm understanding for my future in the
business of international affairs. I would also like to thank Dr. Harry Vanden for his
support and wisdom throughout the years. Though we may not always see eye to eye on
many things, I am confident that his wisdom has forever impacted the way I see the
world.
An acknowledgement goes out to 2nd Lt. Alexander “Sasha” Golenko, SFC
Steven Beck, LTC Padraig Clark, LTC Melanie Perez, Lt. Col Bill Matkin, MAJ Randy
Zipperer, Mr. Peter Wilson, Mr. Jeffrey Knight, Mr. Jonathan White, Mr. Carlos Paez,
Mr. Mark Hinchcliffe, John, Mr. Jeffrey Greenwald, and Mr. David Olson. Your
knowledge and experience has made a profound impact on my life. Thank you for what
you have done for me, and what you do every day for this great country.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge Ms. Nancy Soderberg my mentor, professor, and
friend. I have come a long way in this journey from student to professional and without
you, I would have never made it this far. Your support for me has gone well beyond the
student professor relationship. Your service and commitment to both this great country

and the University North Florida far exceeds all others in our business. I will always be
indebted to you for what you have done for me.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

ii

Abstract

iii

Introduction
Research Question
Hypothesis
Previous Theoretical Discussion
Methodology and Research Design
Concepts and Definitions
Assumptions

1
8
10
13
19
24
28

Chapter One: Case Studies
Effects of Acculturation Stress Among Other Groups: Korean Gangs and
Immigrant Youth
The Case of Sami Osmakac: Jihad in Tampa Bay
The Case of Mohamed Merah: American vs. French Radicalization Patterns

33

Conclusion and Findings

60

Bibliography

64

33
40
48

List of Tables
Table 1- FBI’s Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad

18

Table 2- FBI “Conversion” Observables

25

Table 3- Radicalization Process of Western Muslim Youth into
Homegrown Terrorist

27

Table 4- Radicalization Process of Korean American Youth into Gang
Member

28

Table 5- Socioeconomic Trends Common Amongst Korean Immigrants

34

Table 6- Radicalization Process of Korean American Youth into Gang
Member “Joong and his Boys”

40

Table 7- Radicalization Process of Western Muslim Youth into
Homegrown Terrorist “Sami Osmakac”

47

Table 8- Radicalization Process of Western Muslim Youth into
Homegrown Terrorist “Mohamed Merah”

59

Table 9- Patterns of Acculturation Stress / Bipolar Life / Lack of
Integration by Case

60

ii

Abstract
Western nations continue to face potential attacks from violent extremist
organizations waging a campaign of violence in the name of political Islam. Though
these attacks are traditionally labeled as originating from abroad, leaders of these
extremist organizations are utilizing a new tactic of radicalizing native or naturalized
citizens from within Western countries in an effort to bypass the massive defensive
security apparatus Western governments have put in place since the September 11
attacks.
These undistinguishable citizens turned radical jihadists, better known as
homegrown terrorists, represent a clear and present danger to the security of the United
States. In an effort to understand the problem, this paper seeks to identify patterns
common amongst these individuals and addresses the question “How does a Muslim
youth become radicalized into a homegrown terrorist?” This research will use a case
study approach to identify patterns of radicalization in convicted homegrown terrorist and
test the hypothesis that a failure of integration will cause some Western Muslim youth to
radicalize and in some cases, commit violent crimes of terrorism.

iii

Introduction
“Hi Mom, I’m in Somalia! Don’t worry about me…I’m okay,” was how the
mother of 17-year-old American high school student Burhan Hassan had discovered
where her son had gone after he went missing for over two weeks.1 It was a devastating
announcement to the Minneapolis-St.Paul, Minnesota immigrant who had fled the
violence and extreme poverty in Somalia hoping to seek refuge and a better opportunity
for her family in the West.
Burhan was described by many in the Minneapolis-St. Paul community as a
“good boy”, “a good student”, and did not have a criminal record. But what worried
Burhan’s mother was not the fact that her son had run away from home and was now
living in war ravaged Somalia, but “how exactly did a 17-year-old student from a
relatively poor Somali community in Minnesota afford the $2,000 plane ticket plus
expenses to the strife torn country”?2
Authorities would later discover through the investigation that Hassan and several
other Muslim American youths from the Minneapolis- St. Paul Somali community had
been recruited and radicalized in the United States via the internet, and later transported,
financed, and trained in Somalia by the Al Qaeda affiliate movement “Al Shabaab”,
which

like
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organization
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attacks
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against the United States and other Western countries around the world through the use of
political Islam and terrorism.
Why and how could an American youth, born in the United States, educated in the
public school system, offered American opportunities for success found nowhere else,
and raised with American values suddenly decide to betray his country and join a violent
extremist group like Al-Shabaab? In recent years, cases like that of Hassan’s have
become of increasing concern as over two hundred men and women born or raised in the
West have participated in, or provided support to Islamic terrorist plots and attacks.
Essentially these individuals are transformed from undistinguishable Western youth to
what has been coined as homegrown terrorists; a form of radical Islam that involves
citizens and/or residents of Western countries who “have picked up the Islamic sword of
the ideas”, demonstrating a rapid behavioral lifestyle change, and are willing to attack
their own countries, even if they are themselves or others killed in the process.3
What authorities face are individuals who are not motivated by money or luxuries,
but by religious words meanings. President of the RAND Corporation Brian Jenkins best
describes this as “terrorists do not simply fall from the sky. They emerge from a set of
strongly held beliefs. They are radicalized. Then, they become terrorists”.4 The power of
the word is a pivotal point of this study since it examines individuals willing to die for
what they believe in. The primary cases of homegrown terrorism found in chapter one of
this thesis will explain how two young men made the leap and pledged their lives in order
to commit what they considered to be true “jihad” and “shahȃdat” (martyrdom).
3

Thachuk, Kimberley L. , Bowman, Marion E. “Spike” and Richardson, Courtney. Homegrown Terrorism: The
Threat Within . Washington DC: National Defense University, 2008.
4
Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Grossman, L. (2009). Homegrown Terrorist in the United States and Britain: An Empirical
Examination of the Radicalization Process. Washington DC: FDD Press.
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The word of jihad or “struggle” as it is known in English translation are widely
misunderstood in the West and have come to arouse considerable interest and in some
cases fear.5 The word itself has so strongly engrained itself in the Western psyche that it
has produced fictional images of mass Islamic armies descending upon a helpless city
and forcing the people to convert and killing those who do not. No amount of explanation
can be given to debunk the myth that violence is not the intention or the meaning behind
the word.6 “Jihad” comes from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and from the Koran
which he bestowed upon the Arabs until his death around 632 CE. The Prophet and his
four Caliphs who succeeded him had governed society under Islamic law deemed as
guidance from heaven seeking to build a just, egalitarian society, where poor and
vulnerable people were treated with respect. This demand jihad or “struggle” to unite the
community together in a common defense.7 Though originally intended for the purpose
of good, words can be misinterpreted and misunderstood as is human nature.
Among the Islamic thinkers of the Medieval Christian era, the meaning of the
word “Jihad” as it exposed by radicalized elements of contemporary society began to
emerge. The Islamic Medieval thinker Sayeed Qutib reinterpreted the word to mean
revolutionary activity against all unbelievers not just hostile unbelievers in the pursuit of
establishing Shari’ah or Islamic Law.8 Qutib was not a believer in the idea that forcible
conversion in waging jihad, but had no tolerance for any government which did not

5

Taleqani, A. M., Mutahhari, A. M., Shari'ati PhD, A., & Ayoub, M. (1986). Jihad and Shahdat: Strugle and
Martyrdom in Islam. (M. Abedi, & G. Legenhausen, Eds.) Houston: Islamic Publications International.pg.1.
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strictly enforce fundamental Islamic Law on its people.9 This form of governance was
assumed to be necessary in order to fit a “just state” and society in accordance with the
right of God. Those who have taken the ideas of jihad from Qutib and other Islamic
theologians like him have associated and divided society into two categories; the right
and the wrong.
Reports by leading experts in the field of terrorism Daveed Gartenstein-Ross &
Laura Grossman assert “there are many different kinds of terrorists in Western societies,
driven to violence by diverse motivations; for example, one of America’s most notorious
homegrown terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh, a white man from a Christian
background proves that this is not specifically a Muslim problem. But transnational
Islamic terrorism (ranging and spanning from all over the world and including many
races and ethnicities)—due to the size and capabilities of the movement, among other
factors—is likely “the most threatening one to western values, interests and societies.”10
A popular stereotype common amongst the less intrepid minded Islamaphobics
and the media, who tends to install fear and hate towards they see as different, would
argue that the Muslim community as a whole in the West is doing little to counter the
growing threat of radicalization and creation of homegrown terrorists. While it is
ridiculous to assert that the entire Western Muslim community is actively engaged in acts
of terrorism or compliance with the ideology; there is some margin of truth to this claim
in regards to what some have noted as a “silent majority” among Muslims in the West
who fail to speak out against those who radicalize or are akin to jihadist ideology. This
“silent majority” which represents the broad, overarching stream of law abiding, patriotic,
9

Taleqani, A. M., Mutahhari, A. M., Shari'ati PhD, A., & Ayoub, M. (1986). Pg. 15.
Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Grossman, L. (2009).
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and secularly tolerant sides of Islam in the West is forced into a moral quagmire of sorts
where a process of growing unease about Muslim loyalties and security considerations in
regards to the nations where they reside and the broader community as a whole exists.
Roose & Akbarzadeh Muslims, Multiculturalism and the Question of the
Silent Majority explains that “this process of being silent has further muffled the voice of
secular Muslims caught between those that claim that Islam is the religion of Jihad and
those that claim it is a religion of peace and understanding, it is hard to hear those who
present Islam as a component of their identity with no outward manifestations”.11 These
individuals are essentially torn between conflicting loyalties, an internal struggle, of
having to appear as part of “The West” while still attempting to maintain their Muslim
identity. On one side of the society, they are viewed as “culturally Muslim” while on the
other, they are viewed as “sell outs” of the religion.12
A secondary component to this struggle involves the threats posed by those who
advocate Islam as a religion of Jihad to Muslims of a secular and cultural nature. Roose
and Akbarzadeh assert that from the perspective of Islamists, “Muslims who seek to
build bridges between Muslims (culturally secular) and the broader non-Muslim
communities are seen as disingenuous and subversive” as Islam and the West are
incompatible as some members of Fundamentalist groups have asserted.13 Labels such as
“disingenuous” and “subversive” can easily create a sense of fear in the culturally
Muslim community and force these individuals to remain silent in their communities,

11
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despite their traditionally liberal stance on secularism and pro-tolerant attitude toward
non-Muslims.
However, though this fear and silence does exist within the community, it is not a
delineating factor. Some members of this majority do believe in a tolerant version of
Islam and speak up against those who they perceive as “hijackers” of the religion. For
these individuals and greater Western society, Western Muslims do and should be
obligated to cooperate fully with authorities in order to prevent terrorism as will be
described in the case studies portion of this thesis.
There are efforts by US presidents and other Western leaders such as Barak
Obama’s historic speech in Cairo after his election to reach out to the Muslim community
and combat the Islamophobic image hyped by the media and hate mongers. Though these
efforts constitute a major step in fostering understanding and building bridges of
tolerance, a closer examination of what the Western Muslim communities are doing
internally to stem possible radicalization from abroad is needed.
For example, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) which is by far
the most vocal and well known Western group for debunking Islamaphobic myths and
accusations has established programs and initiatives to enable Muslim youth in the West
alternative venues to voice their ideas and frustrations. Youth programs such as
Leadership symposiums, internships, and connections to jobs and positions in some of the
highest levels of the United States government illustrate the council’s efforts to counter
radicalization in their communities and promote tolerance.14

9

Saylor, C. P. (n.d.). Written Statement of the Council on American-Islamic Relations On The Extent of Radicalization
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Programs like the ones CAIR offers presents a possible long term solution to
combat radicalization and encourage “bridge building” between Muslims and nonMuslims in the West. However, though CAIR tends to portray itself as a bridge between
the communities, some remain skeptical to the true intentions of the organization
specifically the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).15 The most credible
evidence against the organization has been the arrests of high ranking officials and board
members over the last 10 years to include supplying equipment and financial backing to
listed terror organizations abroad.
The study of Western Muslim youth radicalizing and turning into homegrown
terrorists is difficult to assess because cases of radicalization are unique and will not
always produce an “ideal type case” such as those of Bahran Hassan, Sami Osmakac, or
Mohamed Merah. Furthermore, research on the subject is problematic due to the issues of
finding extensive research on the relatively new phenomenon, the rare event of such
cases occurring, and establishing a “red line” of guidance in order to identify where
boasting rhetoric such as radical anti-Western speech and ideals constitutes an individual
crossing a threshold, and pushing them towards actually executing or preparing to
execute violent terrorist attacks.
What little research does exist on Muslim sociological study, examination on the
topic of assimilation, and the resulting stress into Western society in the early twenty first
century seems to associate the Muslim community into two segments; the second
generation youth and their parents. The experience of Muslim youth in the West differs

15
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greatly from their parents. Though they physically moved to the West, they remained
mentally in the in the “Old Country”.16
However, the research tends to assert the following traits of commonality:
feelings of social isolation, perceived discrimination by society and the media, and an
identity crisis culminating in a lack of full integration into the society. Everyday these
individuals ask themselves “who am I? Muslim? American? Algerian? French?
Something new”? Are individuals such as first, second or even third generation citizens
identifying with their parents version of Islamic lifestyles as they know it from their
homelands prior to their immigration?17 How does this perception of discrimination and
suspicion make them feel about their fellow citizens? Are these youths being forced by
their peers to live in a social polarized world where at school and in public, they are in
West as mainstream America knows it, but when they return home, they are in Yemen?18
What is this doing to their identity development and does this have an effect on those
who radicalize into homegrown terrorist?

Research Question
In an effort to assist Federal Authorities and academia to understand the problem
and potential threat of a homegrown terrorist, and how these individuals radicalize; this
thesis will give evidence, identify patterns, and provide a new framework to answer the
question “how does a Western Muslim youth become radicalized into a homegrown
16

Abdo, G. (2006). Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11. New York City: Oxford University
Press. Pg. 4
17
Haddad, Y. Y. (2004). Not Quite American? The Shaping of Arab and Muslim Identity in the United States . Waco:
Baylor University Press.
18
Sarroub, Loukia K. (2005) All American Yemeni Girls: Being Muslim in a Public School. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press. Pg. 1
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terrorist”? The development of the research question is formulated by first dismissing
three primary assertions which have been noted in previous research such as age,
citizenship, and the concept for “undeniable evidence of preparation for attacks”. 19
For the purpose of this study, age is an important factor. The most common
example the general public will associate with the analysis of homegrown terrorism is
exemplified by the homegrown attacks by Palestinian American U.S. Army psychologist
Major Nadel Malik Hasan. Hasan. Hasan gained infamy in November of 2009 when he
went on a shooting rampage Ft. Hood US army base in Texas. During the attack, Hasan
took the lives of 13 American soldiers and injured 32 before he was shot and paralyzed
from the waist down by responding security forces. By all accounts, Hasan demonstrates
a clear cut case of homegrown terrorism in the United States.
However, this case is dismissed from this evaluation due to the individual’s age.
The cases studied in this research as well as statistics, theories, and data sources provided
for the developments of this research question indicate that the majority of individuals
who become homegrown terrorists and attack are in their late twenties to early thirties.20
Therefore, Major Hassan represents somewhat of an anomaly to other homegrown
terrorists as he was in his late thirties and executed his attack at 39 years old.21 Hassan’s
case may be of a homegrown nature, but his case is not in the category of Western
Muslim youth radicalizing due to his age at time of radicalization and attack.

20

Jenkins, Brian Michael. (2011). Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to
Jihadist Terrorism in the United States After 9/11. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
21

Associated Press. (2012, April 10). Major Nidal Hasan, Fort Hood Shooting Suspect, Wants Trial Delayed.
Retrieved April 11, 2012, from Huffington Post Online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/10/nidal-hasantrial_n_1414369.html
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Secondly, this research question focuses mainly on individual youth who
subscribe to the Islamic faith since either birth or since religious conversion who reside as
identified citizens of Western countries primarily those living in the United States and
Western European. For the purpose of this study, the data looks at the individual and not
community level.22 Above all, the individual assessed in this study must in some form be
identified as citizens or residents of a Western country.
Finally, the term “radicalization” or the process whereby an individual or group
adopts extreme views and justifies acts of violence, criminality, or terrorism based on
those views is a distinguishing feature from other studies.23 This transformation indicates
that the individual has actually moved beyond boasting of anti-Western rhetoric and have
gone out and actually executed, or prepared to execute a violent attack to enable chaos.
This can be exemplified by individual acquiring lethal arms or explosives or other
preparations for attacks on a target within the country they are living in. Therefore,
simply being anti-Western or anti-American, etc is not grounds to label an individual as a
potential candidate for radicalization into a homegrown terrorist.

Hypothesis
This research hypothesizes that the radicalization of Western youth who join
violent extremist organizations occurs due to a “lack of integration” into a society which
will cause some youth to radicalize and in some cases commit violent acts of terrorism.
This hypothesis was formulated by an in-depth study from sociology scholars,
government studies on the Muslim community, case examinations, and independent

22
23

Jenkins, “Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies”. pg. viii
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research on the subject of Muslims residing in Western countries. The term “lack of
integration” involves the combination and examination of three specific factors; social
isolation, perceived discrimination, depression, and identity crisis spawned by a failure to
integrate into society.
The proponent term of “lack of integration” is an interesting component to the
development of the hypothesis due to the conception of “who is ultimately responsible
for its failure in the West? Is it simply a Muslim problem within the community? Is it a
societal problem within communities of non-Muslims? Or is it a combination of both
including factors of negative perception and predisposed bias influenced by the media?
Islam as a religion tends to seek a more devout relationship with a higher power
than most secularized religions which exist in the United States. In terms of
radicalization, it is by far the most targeted in the Western mainstream psyche. 24
However, it can be fully argued that there is an alarming trend of other devout groups in
the West engaging in militancy based on religious ideals. For example, Jewish
radicalization occurring in the West specifically for the purpose of travel to what Byman
and Sachs have coined as “The Wild West Bank”.25 In fact, some radical Jewish groups
such as the Jewish Defense League or JDL have gone so far as to attempt to recruit

24

Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Grossman, L. (2009).
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religious Jews with military training from Western countries to join West Bank settlers in
somewhat of a quasi “militant tourism” to Jewish outposts in the Palestinian territories.26
The pivotal question facing the Muslim population in the West is “how does the
community, family, and future generations remain Islamic in non-Muslim Countries?27
The trends associated with the Muslim community of wearing Islamic garments, growing
beards, praying in public, as well as assigning life priorities and schedules to cope with
the laws of Islam illustrates a purpose of identification within the community in order to
show “who is Muslim” and “who is not”. The strength of this devotion essentially
represents an alignment with a broader Muslim social and political agenda which
virtually extends beyond the recognized borders of the Geo-political West encompassing
a much more global identity.28 For this community, overt display of religious devotion
indicts a sense of an over arching group which is not limited to one country or another; a
virtual commitment to a unified solidarity between one another.
In the second perspective of how Islamic communities in the West are viewed by
non-Muslims, the perception is rooted in the idea that Islam and the cultural and religious
norms and customs illustrated by Muslims are a case of perceived “backwardness” or a
group which lacks “modernity” in the West. This assertion essentially coats the entire
Muslim community as the virtual “other” which is exasperated by the September 11th
attacks and the media hype of a growing threat to Western civilization. To the non-

26
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religious and secularized non-Muslim communities in the West, Islamic traditions such as
eating only Hilal (Kosher foods), displaying Hijab (female head scarfs) as well as praying
five times a day represent an antithesis and refutation to what it means to be American,
German, French, or overall “modern in the West”.
To the non-Muslim community, “there is an inherent contradiction between all
‘traditional religions’ and modernity, and only if these behaviors are altered can they be
compatible to a modern society”.29 The general consensus is that these “backwards”
people need the help of the non-Muslim community in order to overcome their “lack of
modernity” and become “Western”. For example, recent contemporary issues in Western
countries such as the outlawing of the female full body and face garment like the burka
and Niqab in France illustrate that the West views these physical religious displays as
against “modernity” and anti-West. Additionally, these bans also show that the general
feeling among Western non-Muslim societies is that these communities need “our help”
to modernize and integrate into the Western society.

Previous Theoretical Discussion
The first theoretical discussion in order to understand how a “lack of integration”
could produce a ripe candidate for radicalization can best be exemplified in the theory of
acculturation primarily focused on the idea of observable traits caused by the process
known as “acculturation stressors”. The theory of acculturation stress was first explained
in Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus’s Is Acculturation Unidimensional or Bidimensional?: A
Head-to-Head Comparison in the Prediction of Demographics, Personality, Self-Identity,
29
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and Adjustment. However, the Ph.D dissertation of Glenn Richard Olds from Texas
A&M University (2009) on studies of religious cultural integration among Muslim
Americans and how acculturation stressors may affect their integration and social
behaviors into the American landscape will be the primary source for explaining
acculturation stress among Muslim youth in the West.
Olds explains that “acculturation, or the phenomena which results when groups of
individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with
subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups creates stress
on individuals and could lead to positive and negative consequences”.30 Broken down
into simpler terms, acculturation stress can be understood from the story below:
A man from country “A” immigrates to country “B” with his wife and two
teenage children. When he arrives, his children are placed in Country “B”s
public school system while the father and mother remain and work in a distinct
ethno religious enclave of a major Western city where they predominantly
associate and work with other immigrants from country “A”. Here they are able
to maintain their heritage language and culture on a daily basis. Their home life
is no different than it was when they lived in country “A” to include speaking the
language of country “A”, eating only country “A” food, and watching only
country “A” television.
However, the children who go to public school come into constant contact with
children from Country “B” who display accepted customs, languages, and norms
associated with this country and are apt to point out the differences of the
children from country “A”. The children from country “A” begin to realize that
they are viewed as “outsiders”, “different”, or “the others” due to their
appearance, language, and customs. In an effort to show their willingness to
belong, gain inclusion, and acceptance, the children from country “A” begin to
enact the survival mechanism of acculturation or replicating the norms,
language, and customs of country “B” as they have learned from observing the
children, teachers, and other mediums at school. The acculturation begins to
lead to some degree of acknowledgement amongst the peer children in country
“B” and the children of country “A” begin to gain some acceptance, but are still
knowingly considered as “outsiders”.
The children from country “A” return to their parents home and begin to exhibit
their new found acculturation traits and behaviors. This in turn causes a
backlash at home as the parents of the children do not fully understand why or
30
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where the children are learning these behaviors because they are viewed as
improper or wrong in country “A”’s society. This leads to added stress on the
children as the parents begin to assert more authority and demands on what they
view as “the proper norms and customs” they are expected to follow even if they
no longer live in country “A”. Essentially the children from country “A” begin to
act like they are from country “B” when they are outside the home, but return to
the accepted norms of country “A” when they return home to their parents. Two
worlds are essentially created; one where integrating into society is expected and
one where lack of integration is expected.

This diverging and polarizing expectations essentially creates two different
versions of country “B” where there are dual expectations placed on the children to
satisfy both areas of acceptance adding stress and confusion on the children of who or
what behaviors are accepted.
In order to measure acculturation stress, Olds conducted online surveys through
Islamic American websites of 229 participants of Islamic faith or background. The
majority of participants are either 1st or 2nd generation American and in their late teens to
early thirties. Olds utilized a modified version of the Vancouver Index of Acculturation
(VIA-Islamic version) (VIA, Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000) a 20-statement measure
which asked participants to answer questions such as “I enjoy social activities with
typical North American people.” Items are broken down into two subscales of ten items
each. The first subscale measures interest in heritage cultural activities while the second
subscale measures interest in host cultural activities. The subscales features mirrored
items such as “I often behave in ways that are typical of my heritage culture” or “I often
behave in ways that are considered to be ‘typically American”.31
The participants were then asked to complete an additional survey to measure the
level of acculturative stress on a family level, as measured by the Social, Attitudinal,
Familial, and Environmental Acculturation Stress Scale (SAFE, Mena, Padilla, &
31
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Maldonado, 1987). These self administered reports feature “24 items that are rated on a
6-point Likert scale” and feature questions such as “My family members do not
understand my American values” and “My family members and I have different
expectations about my future”.
The final scale which Olds used in his measurement of acculturation stress is the
Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale. This scale has been recommended
for use with non-clinical populations, non-western populations, and Muslims in particular
because of the focus on affective experiences vs. severe symptomology and suicidality.
Twenty responses are scored on a four-point Likert scale and feature questions such as “I
felt that people dislike me” or “I thought my life had been a failure (CES-D)”.32 Olds
took the results of the first two surveys in order to measure the level of acculturation that
the participants experienced and compared the results to the level of the participants cited
depression as measured by the CES-D.
This thesis will utilize acculturation stressors and lack of integration highlighted
in Old’s research as a basis for examination of the cases in chapter one. However, an
additional factor is involved in the theory development in order to enhance and
operationalize the “expected integration” or expected “lack of integration” component of
acculturation stress. It is evolved and defined by the term bipolar life. This term is
defined as a “polarized lifestyle”; a “life, in two distinct cultures”. As highlighted in the
story mentioned above, there are essentially two worlds of “reality” in development; one
which encourages integration into a society and the other discouraging it.
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The term bipolar life can also be applied to the constraints a society places on a
community or the constraints which an individual can create themselves in their own
minds. For example, convicted homegrown terrorist Sami Osmakac virtually created his
own bipolar life by devising a world view of “the right devout Muslim world” and the
world of the “sinners and unbelievers”. Additionally, society can also create this bipolar
life due to segregation. For example, the socioeconomic separation in France between the
posh lifestyles of the Champs d’ Lyse and that of the French suburbs of the banlieue can
create such a reality of two different versions of France.33 This creation of bipolar life all
stem from acculturation stress and a lack of integration into mainstream Western culture
which could have serious effects on an individual making them potentially susceptible to
radicalization.
The next theory from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) The
Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad will be used to examine the
radicalization of the individual.

The framework takes account of the individual

psychological process which has been noted in other terrorist studies, but is unique
because it assesses individual choice and “pathways of action” to either continue
becoming more involved with violent groups or leave and return to their previous lives
before beginning to radicalize.34 This theory assumes that an individual will radicalize by
following four steps that includes pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination, and
finally action.
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Table 1- FBI’s Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad


Pre-Radicalization: Which includes motivation, conversion, stimulus and incubator
opportunity to radicalize



Identification: Individual has taken acceptance of a “cause” and begins isolating
themselves from their former lives.



Indoctrination: Individual convinced that action is required to support the cause.



Action: Committing acts of terrorism. Individual knowingly engages in extremist
activity.
.
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This framework asserts that this trend toward radicalization occurs when
individuals known as a “jilted believer” experiences a “religious awakening” that can
either be due to a conversion to the religion or a “reinterpretation” of the meaning in the
faith virtually making them “born again” and becomes more deeply ingrained to the faith.
Though this theory identifies important patterns stemming from a “lack of integration”
such as social isolation, depression, and identity crisis, it does not examine family, social
pressures or motivations as a catalyst for radicalization.
This lack of added criteria as mentioned above would later delegitimize the
framework for the FBI as recent homegrown terror plots did not fit neatly into this
radicalization model. This would later result in FBI Director Robert Mueller to
acknowledge that the threat from homegrown terrorism may have evolved to include
“extremists from a diverse set of backgrounds, geographic locations, life experiences, and
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motivating factors.”36 This presumed “x factor” is essentially missing from the
framework. Therefore, this theory further extends the research, but is in need of added
criteria mentioned by Director Mueller in order to address the evolving threat. Creating a
new framework for this evolving threat is a primary goal of this research.
Combining the work of Olds on acculturation stress to the FBI’s theory will
essentially “fill the gap” to address the evolving threat highlighted by Director Mueller.
When applied to the cycle, Olds theory as well as evidence of a bipolar life will illustrate
a clear linkage to suggest that acculturation stressors create the “lack of integration
criteria” explained in the hypothesis of this thesis and create a ripe environment for
radicalization.
This thesis will combine all of the discussed theories in order to form an
evaluation of the selected case studies listed in chapter one. The FBI theory will be used
to assess and identify the level of observable radicalization from seemingly
“undistinguishable” youth to “converts” to homegrown terrorist. Finally, the research
from Olds Jr’s dissertation on acculturation stress on individuals will be used to identify
factors exhibiting lack of integration and the effects of bipolar life and depression
amongst Western Muslim youth.

Methodology and Research Design
The concept of identity in regards to Western Muslim youth is of importance to
this study because human beings tend to develop identity in their formative years of
youth and adolescence. In the post September 11th era, the development of the Muslim
identity in the West especially for the youth is a quite remarkable area of study. Though
36
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the long term effects of the attacks and their aftermath are yet to be determined, it is an
event which continues to reverberate in both the shaping of Muslim and their neighbors
in the West today.37
The variables for how acculturation stress affects the individual’s radicalization
process are addressed below:
Independent Variable: Western Muslim Youth
Dependent Variable: Radicalization Cycle
The individuals assessed in the case study portion of chapter one must meet several
criteria prior to selection. Primarily, the individual being evaluated must have spent a
“significant portion of their formative years of youth and adolescence in a Western
country, or must bear a significant connection to life in the West” prior to starting to
radicalize. For example, Gartenstein-Ross and Gross highlight the case of Brooklyn
bookstore owner Abdulrahman Farhane, “who in November 2006 pleaded guilty to
conspiring to launder money in a terrorist financing case. Because Farhane did not spend
his formative years in America, and there is no record of him radicalizing in the United
States because he left Morocco in 1987 when he was 32 years old cases like his are
excused from the study. Apparently, Farhane developed extremist views while growing
up in Morocco and not in the U.S.”.38 Therefore, age and self-development of an
individual’s formative years must be spent in the West. Therefore, those cases such as
Farhane’s will be excluded from evaluation.
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The cases studied in chapter one are addressed as individuals who share a set of
common behavioral experiences. It is impossible to assess the total extent of life factors,
experiences, and variables associated which may lead to radicalization. However,
studying the general life experiences documented in Islamic family life such as public
experiences of discrimination as well as the general life experiences; it is possible to
capture a broad understanding of acculturation stressors, lack of integration, bipolar life,
and what it means to be a Western Muslim youth. Additionally, the candidates assessed
must display overt behavioral changes which reflect the theories of acculturation stress
and radicalization process as in the previous theories. Simply spouting rhetoric or ideals
is not considered grounds for evaluation.
Though it can be asserted that naivety and youthful ignorance may result in youth
joining these groups, this study will examine individuals who where “ready to be
terrorists” by observing noted dramatic shifts in their behavior. These observables must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these individuals were ready to join these
organizations and commit acts of violence and not just be noted for their rhetoric and
boasting criticisms against non-Muslims.39 For example, Anjem Choudry who advocates
implementation of Islamic Shariah Law in Great Britain may be responsible for inspiring
others to radicalize and displays traits and observables like the ones listed in theories
above, but until he commits an act of terror, cases such as his will be excluded because it
is nothing more than negative rhetoric.40
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The case studies will focus only on individuals who have been convicted of
terrorism through actual attacks or planning to use acts of violence against their home
countries. This can prove to be difficult as the majority of individuals who execute
attacks do not live to tell their story or their motivation for radicalizing and attacking
because they are usually killed in the attack. Therefore, the cases focus on homegrown
terrorist who are charged either in life or posthumously. However, they must be formally
charged by an appointed and recognized court of law in the West. For example, the
actions of convicted homegrown terrorist Mohamed Merah; a radical Islamist linked to a
killing spree in southern France who died in a shootout with French Special police was
still convicted and charged for terrorism even after his death. 41 Simply put, if charges
have been levied against the individual, they are fair candidates for evaluation.
Each case will examine “motivation” for radicalizing. This criteria is included and
evaluated in order to dispel the commonly held assumption that “this individual went
crazy and shot or blew people up” as this is a relatively easy scapegoat. The individual
must therefore, have a stated cause, a raison d’être for why they made the leap toward
radicalization. For example, British Pakistani homegrown terrorist Mohammed Sadique
Khan expressed claims he is engaging in defensive activities prompted by British foreign
policies that result in the perpetration of “atrocities against my people all over the world”
highlighting cases such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan as examples.42
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A breadth of candidates in terms of race and ethnicity are selected in order to
avoid labeling heritage nationalities such as Palestinian American, Pakistani British, or
French Algerian youth, etc. as being prone to radicalization as such assertions are bound
to be labeled as Islamaphobic. The cases will be organized by first describing the crimes
committed, followed by an evaluation of the individual’s transition to radicalization prior
to conviction. Additionally, these examinations will cite how each individual moved from
rhetoric, to opportunities for action, and eventually became charged for terrorism by an
appointed and recognized court of law.
The case studies begin with the examination of other groups emanating from
relatively successful immigrant communities to the West who suffer from acculturation
stress and radicalize into members of criminal groups. Exemplified in the case study of
Korean immigrant youth joining violent gangs, this case will be used as a comparison in
order to exhibit that acculturation stress, bipolar life, and lack of integration is not solely
reserved to Western Muslim youth. Its purpose is to show that these factors can play a
significant part in radicalizing other children of immigrant parents who reside in the
West.
The final two cases assessed will focus on two specific individuals Sami Osmakac
and Mohamed Merah. Both began as seemingly undistinguishable Western Muslim youth
before radicalizing. The case of American homegrown terrorist Sami Osmakac will
demonstrate the result of acculturation stress in the United States. The case of Mohamed
Merah will illustrate the effects of acculturation stress in Europe in order to show that the
problem does occur outside of the United States.
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Each case will be evaluated, measured, and listed into a summarizing framework
organized along the following seven observables: nationality, conversion, motivation, and
evidence of acculturation stress / bipolar life, opportunity for action / incubators, and
finally charges for terrorism activity. It is important to note that for the assessment of
Korean youth gang activity, the observables of “conversion” will indicate becoming
involved in gang life and the sections “charged as homegrown terrorist” will be changed
to “charged as gang member”.
The framework will be listed in order to display the symptoms suffered by each
individual enabling radicalization. In the conclusion section of chapter four, the
frameworks will be listed together in order to highlight any patterns observed in the case
of each individual. The comparison will prove that a pattern does occur between Western
Muslim youth who radicalized into homegrown terrorists.

Concepts and Definitions
The concepts and definitions of this research must be clearly explained in order to
eliminate confusion or misdirection of the cases described in chapter one. These
concepts and definitions were collected from a breadth of sources to include government
agencies, academia, and private institutions. Additionally, this section includes data
sources and how these terms are operationalized and measured.
First, the term conversion is explained as a noticeable change in one’s religious
identity, a conscious self transformation that may take the form of a change from:
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Table 2- FBI “Conversion” Observables


Change of one formal faith to another



Change from a secular belief to a formal faith



A recommitment to an existing faith

.
43
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The FBI, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the NYPD all assess
measurement of converts to Islam as a series of observable changes such as physical
appearances as well as an individual’s rapid behavioral change to wearing exclusively
traditional Islamic garb, growing a beard, etc. However, these organizations also measure
the term to include involvement, commitment, and indoctrination with other individuals
suspected of illicit or violent enterprises. These individual are then connected to violent
terrorist organizations abroad demonstrating a significant change in life they previously
identified with before converting or discovering a “renewal” of faith. The term of
“renewal” can also mean a person of Muslim upbringing or background who has found a
strong, renewed interest in the religion and has begun interpreting the faith in a violent or
antagonistic way toward those who do not subscribe to strict Islamic protocol as well as
increased involvement in social groups who boast Jihadist ideals.
For the purpose of this research the term acculturation stress or stressors occurring
as a result of the survival mechanism of acculturation which have the potential for both
beneficial and detrimental outcomes, whereas “culture shock” casts the multicultural
encounter in a purely negative light and consequence to include depression, social
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isolation, identity crisis, and assimilation problems.43 These factors produce a source for
feelings of “lack of integration”.
The concept of Muslim identity will be defined as a developed, stable sense of
self and resolved security in one’s basic values, attitudes, and beliefs. Developmentally,
its formation typically occurs in a crisis of adolescence or young adulthood, and is
tumultuous and emotionally challenging. However, the successful development of
personal identity is essential to the integrity and continuity of the personality. 44 This term
is coupled with “lack of identity” or “identity crisis” suggesting the individual is unable,
incapable, or unwilling to establish as “stable sense of self” as a result of psychological
issues or factors within their environment.
Integration in regards to each individual evaluated in the case studies portion of
this research will be defined as “retaining some aspects of a minority identity and practice
while at the same time adopting features of the identity and lifestyle of the dominant
culture”45 This concept is combined with the term “lack of integration” which is a broad
term to describe traits exhibited as a result of acculturation stressors such as social
isolation, identity crisis, perceived discrimination, etc. as outlined by Olds Jr.’s research
as well as the FBI’s study of radicalization among Western Islamic youth. Furthermore,
Olds’s research uses the VIA, SAFE, and Depression Index surveys to measure the level
of acculturation stress.
The terms Opportunity for Action & Incubators are described by the FBI’s study
as “venues or locations that provide a setting for radicalization by offering an opportunity

43

Olds Jr, Glenn Richard, PhD. Pg. 16.

44
45

Borum, Randy. Psyhcology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004. Pg. 25
Olds Jr, Glenn Richard, 2009, pg. 25

26

to meet likeminded people and by giving an individual inspiration or serving as a
recruiting ground” and are an important concept to the study because a fire does not
begin without a spark. These places may include “the internet, prisons, mosques, clubs or
associations, private or public schools, universities, and sports activities” where the
opportunity to join social cliques (electronically or in person) to spread and share a
common vision of radical ideas, training, or planning can be candidly discussed.46 The
Tables listed on the following page provide an example of the Radicalization framework.

Table 3- Radicalization Process of Western Muslim Youth into Homegrown Terrorist
Name

Nationality

Conversion Type
(rejuvenated or
formal conversion)

Motivation

Evidence of
Acculturation Stress /
Lack of Integration

Opportunity for
Action / Incubator

Charged
as
Homegrown
Terrorist

xxx

British

-Rejuvenated
conversion to
Islam

-Atrocities
against
Muslims in
Iraq and
Afghanistan

-Depression

-Training

yes

-Social Isolation

-Membership in
jihadi groups
(online or in
person)

-Increased
religious
observables

-Perceived
Discrimination
-Identity Crisis

- Radical change
in behavior

-Family Issues
-Bipolar Life
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-Mosques
associated with
jihadi activity
-Planning for
terrorist attacks

Table 4- Radicalization Process of Korean American Youth into Gang Member
Name

Nationality

Conversion

Motivation

Evidence of
Acculturation Stress /
Lack of Integration

Opportunity for
Action / Incubator

Charged as
Gang Member

xxx

USA

-Increased
gang
observables

-Deprivation

-Depression

-Membership in
gang groups

Yes

-Material
Desire

-Social Isolation

- Radical
change in
behavior

-Inclusion in
group

-Perceived
Discrimination

-Venues
associated with
gang activity

-Identity Crisis
-Family Issues
-Bipolar Life

Assumptions
Assumptions are organized into four specific categories; source validity, lifestyle
evaluation, individual choice and rationale, and freedom from fear. The research is based
on a collection of second hand and third hand collection of information. Previous
literature on the topic has been difficult to attain and utilize in this thesis for two reasons.
First, attempting to perform studies on a large ethnic and religious populous like the
Muslims of the West can be problematic since researchers must be cautious that bias
against the group and discrimination does not occur.
The research utilizes famed scholar and sociologist Yavonne Haddad’s Not Quite
American? The Shaping of Arab and Muslim Identity in the United States which
illustrates the development of idenity among these youths. The research also illustrates
observable symptoms of acculturation stress factors. In the cases Haddad uses in her
studies and lectures, she demonstrates how these expierences shaped and formed the
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individuals perception of the world around them and truly captures what it means to be
Muslim in a Western country.
To assess the level of precieved discrimination and depression which these youths
feel, the research employs the work of Loukia Sarroub’s All American Yemeni Girls:
Being Muslim in a Public School. This book provided insight into the level and
experiences of precived discrimination expereinced by these Muslim youth especially
after the events of September 11th. In order to bridge the gender gap, Moustafa
Bayoumi’s How Does it Feel to Be a Problem? Being Young and Arab In America
explained and exemplified young Western Muslim males and females experiences since
September 11th and the social isolation and discrimination they experience from the
society around them.
For the case study portion of the research, this thesis utilizes a wide variety of past
research initiatives on the study of homegrown terrorism such as Alexia O. Huffman’s
Homegrown Terrorism in the United States: Comparing Radicalization Trajectories in
Britain and America, Brian Michael Jenkin’s Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist
Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001, and Kimberley L.
Thachuk, Marion E. “Spike” Bowman, and Courtney Richardson’s Homegrown
Terrorism: The Threat Within to name a few. All of the formentioned texts illustrate
indepth case studies by government, acdemia, and private institutions to assess
individuals who were born or raised in the West during their formative years and
radicalized from seemingly undistinguishable individuals into homegrown terrorists.
As mentioned in the theory evaluation section, the research on acculturation stress
is not a problem soley reserved to Muslim youth in the West. This thesis utilizes
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additional literature on other youth of immigrant parents in the West who have become
susceptable to violent activities and lifestyles. Data for this evaluation is drawn from
research on Korean American gang culture in the book Gangs and Immigrant Youth by
Choo Kyung-Seok. Choo’s research draws on the theory of acculturation stress and the
effects these stressors creates among children of Korean immigrants in the United States.
This evaluation demonstrates and helps to explain cases where these stressors
have led other youth from immigrant communities in the West to join violent criminal
enterprises such as gangs and delinquent groups. Because terrorist groups follow a
similar organizational structure as other criminal enterprises such as street gangs (I.E.
enforcement wing, leadership wing, recruitment, fundraising, etc), it can be understood
that these organizations need to recruit susceptable new members to grow their numbers
and power similar to how a foreign terrorist groups operate. 47 Like the argument
presented by this thesis, Choo explains that transforming an immigrant youth to gang
members is not a quick occurrence but a process. One which is remarkably simmilar to
radicalization of Muslim Western youth due to acculturation stress and a lack of
integration. Therefore, it can be understood that acculturation stress leads to similar forms
of “radicalization” in other minority youths of immigrant parents in Western countries.
The collected information is not from first hand interviews conducted by the
author of this thesis. Though this research is an original work, it must be stated that bias
by the mediums that collected the information may have not been entirely removed from
the end products. An additional form of bias which must be noted is related to the
background and upbringing of the researcher involved in the creation of this project. As a
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white male of European descent from a middle class upbringing, I am an outsider to these
groups in question; bias cannot be ruled out due to this fact.
Secondly, the research draws from cases and experiences and lifestyles which
occur inside the homes and close knit inner family circles of individuals who have been
convicted of being homegrown terrorists. It is possible that holes do and will exist in the
information collected, compiled, and analyzed. The collectors of the information used in
this thesis are assigned with the very difficult task of entering these close net
communities, which is bound to be problematic as many families of convicted
homegrown terrorist refute the charges levied against their kin even with overwhelming
evidence mounted against them.
Because this thesis uses case study analysis of individuals, it must address the
problems of psychology when assessing an individual especially when it involves the
examination of choices and actions. Individual thought process, development of ideas and
decisions to commit an action of violence occurs on an independent level of the mind
which cannot be grouped into one solid framework or process. Therefore, this research
assumes that a correct application of an individual’s psychological thought process is
being properly assessed.
The final assumption to be addressed is the issue of fear which exists among the
individuals and the ethno-religious groups in the study. Members of the Muslim
community who encounter such researchers or collectors of information are quick to
assume that they may very well be accused of being a terrorist or possibly being arrested
under the suspicion of terrorism. This perception of fear found in these communities also
culminate under the guise that the researchers they are talking to may very well be
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undercover police, Federal agents, other terrorist agents or foreign intelligence services.
The main assertion of such paranoia being that the interviewer is perhaps the Israeli
Mossad Intelligence Agency. An additional fear incurs the idea that at any time a mass
surge in violence against the Western Muslim community can occur. This idea can best
be exemplified in the examination of hate crimes occurring since the September 11th
attacks where crimes against Arabs, Muslims, or those assumed to be Muslims have
spiked 1,700 percent and have never returned to their pre-2001 levels.48
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Chapter One: Case Studies

Effects of Acculturation Stress among Other Groups: Korean Gangs & Immigrant Youth

The follow case highlights the bipolarized life and symptoms of acculturation
stress experienced by Korean American youths, and how these factors induce them to
radicalize from seemingly “undistinguishable” youth into violent gang members.
Following the examination of Korean communities in the United States and how this
“clash of cultures” induces bipolar life such as high expectations of parents to perform, or
accepting behaviors and attitudes, which are at odds with their parents, acculturation
stressors, and lack of integration to include prcieved discrimination, social isolation, and
identity crisis will inhibit a path towards radical behavioral changes and violent behavior
involving criminal gangs. Like Muslim immigrants, the Korean immigrant population in
the United States is a relatively new phenomenon in comparison to other immigrant
groups to the West. Despite their first major origins to the United States in 1902, Koreans
have maintained a high level of unique lifestyles and attachments to their Korean heritage
which consists of bonds based on social and shared culture, traditions, language and
foods; they by far hold their heritage and ethnicity higher than any other Asian American
group.49
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Reports from the United States Census Bureau states “the number of Korean
immigrants in the United States grew 27-fold between 1970 and 2007, from 38,711 to 1.0
million, making them the seventh largest immigrant group in the United States after
Mexican, Filipino, Indian, Chinese, Salvadoran, and Vietnamese foreign-born
immigrants”.50 The Korean community also tends to cluster mainly in four distinct
locations in the United States: New York, New Jersey, California, and Virginia. This
clustering provides these immigrants the ability to establish enclaves where they can
remain

in

touch

with

their

heritage

and

maintain

their

traditions.

Socioeconomically, Korean immigrants and their children who constitute second
and third generation immigrants to the United States tend to fall into the following
categories.

Table 5- Socioeconomic Trends Common Amongst Korean Immigrants


High Educational Attainment of Advanced Degrees



High contribution and sacrifice of parent income for educational success and
opportunity for their children.



Heavily involved in the Self-Employment Sector of The United States; most owning
private Businesses or venues.



High rates of child enrollment in private institutions after school (Arts, Music,
Extended Tutoring)



Median Economic Income
51
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Though the data illustrated above provides a sparkling picture of Korean
immigrants and their relative success in the United States, a darker side does exists in the
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Korean community in relation to the growing problem of Korean American youth
becoming involved with criminal gangs. This emerging phenomenon within the widely
claimed “model minority” (cited by many in the United States for their “hard-work ethic
and children’s success) has been damaged in recent years due to the medias spotlight on
viscous gangland attacks, drug dealing, armed robbery, fraud, assault, and violence
committed by Korean American youths who come from Korean immigrant families who
have achieved relative success in the United States.52
In the early 2000s, assistant professor of the criminal justice program at Utica
College Kyung-Seok Choo embarked on a research study for his book Gangs and
Immigrant Youth. Choo’s research wanted to explain for why these seemingly
“undistinguishable” Korean American youths from well established families decided to
join these gangs and how they became so prone and susceptible to engaging in a life of
crime to begin with.
Choo’s research examines Korean immigrants to the United States and their first
and second generation children who tend to follow similar patterns in terms of their
assimilation into the United States society. Choo asserts that the Korean immigrant life in
the United States has been modeled among strong bonds to social traditions, language,
and cultural roots to the Korean peninsula. Despite these claims of “bondedness” towards
tradition, the children of these immigrants are becoming socialized into the American
society value system at a rapid rate. This rapid rate of assimilation while remaining tied
to these traditions illustrates examples of bipolar life in two distinct versions of
“America”.
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This divergent life view is exemplified between the emerging generational gap
between child and parent. While Korean immigrant parents adhere to a high degree of
Korean ethnicity, many of their children remain confused about whom they are;
American or Korean?53 These two versions of reality include a Korean value centric and
one American value centric affecting behaviors and habits which may be incompatible
with one particular culture or another. For example, at home they speak Korean, watch
only Korean shows, and are expected to adhere to their parent’s version of Korean
lifestyles and traditions as they know it from there lives in Korea. As a result of this tuga-war of identity, a crisis of identity and a generational gap between child and parent can
occur leading the youth to seek an alternative identity which can occur by joining a
criminal gang or engaging in delinquent culture.54
Acculturation stressors such as being in an identity crisis is found to be the most
common factor for Korean youth to join gangs, specifically those in the second
generation category. As previously mentioned the “tug-a-war” between two distinct
cultures plays a large part in the formation of these Western youths identity crisis,
coupled by the emerging generational gap between their parents perceived identity of
“what a Korean American should look like” in their relation to what these youths actually
desire and who they see themselves as being a success in their terms.55
The most common theme Choo’s research discovered in the identity development
of Korean American youths who joined these gangs was the constant odds between the
identities of a “twinkie” referring to a Korean America who is “Korean or yellow on the
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outside” and “American or white on the inside” and “fobbies” which conveys the
meaning of “fresh off the boat” in reference to Korean American youth who remain
identified toward their presumed “Koreanness”. For example, “fobbies” tend to speak
Korean the majority of the time, listen only to Korean music, associate only with
Koreans, etc.56
This diversion of identities shows no apparent data over which identity is more
likely to join criminal gangs. However, second generation “twinkies” and “fobbies” are
more likely to be “street socialized” due to immigrant parents self-employment which
includes long working hours, family instability, lack of supervision, and availability of
venues for illegal opportunities.57 An additional component of the development of these
youths cultural identity is deciding “where they belong in society”.
In this area of focus, acculturation stress as a result of lack of integration, social
isolation, perceived discrimination, and bipolar life are clearly involved in the
radicalization process for those who join gangs. For example, during the indoctrination
process of gang membership, Choo asserts that perceived discrimination led to many of
the Korean American youths “forming bonds” in the face of racism in the schools they
attended. Korean American gang leader known only as “Joong” attested that school
teachers in their public school would make snide and racist comments toward him and
other Korean students such as “what are you Koreans doing back there?” and would look
down upon students of Korean heritage. Experiences such as these would lead to the
formation of social cliques of Korean American youth in order to surround themselves
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with a common group and avoid social isolation from the racism and discrimination they
experienced.58
The research claims that many of the gangs begin in these social cliques who form
as a direct result of this discrimination, deviant labeling of these youths, and a need for
friendship which had not existed amongst these Korean American youths. Simply put, the
discrimination and group formation process endowed a peer social network of power; a
sense of unity which had previously not existed giving these youths an identity of their
own.59
Choo also highlights the fact that the level of expectation which is placed upon
these youths by their parents to exceed in life is also a concern for reasons to join these
gangs. The Korean tradition of social mobility through higher education is rooted in
tradition and is by no means exempted from the values of Korean immigrants to the
United States or their children. This passion and possibly “obsession” for their children to
perform above expectation at all times can be exemplified in the private institutions
(music, art, additional math and science classes) these immigrants’ children attend
following the typical public school day in order to prepare for University or Colleges.
However, a significant portion of these children (especially those who have turned
to gang life), did not meet their parents educational or life expectations bestowed upon
them leading to cases of psychological stress.60 Choo claims that in many of the youths
he studied, a common claim was that too much emphasis placed on Korean youth by their
parents to reach high achievement goals led many of them to become “less interested, or
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burned out on education” displaying possible signs of depression. Additionally, many
Korean Youths who attend higher institutes of educations such as college and universities
do not do so for the sake of education, but to satisfy their parent’s high expectations of
them.
Venues for illegal opportunities similar to the “opportunities for action or
incubators” primarily involve clubs, cafes, and bars. At these venues, Korean youth
seeking memberships in the gang (or trying to increase their credentials in the gang) have
access to older members who are heavily involved in the criminal enterprise. Though
most Korean American youths become introduced to gang socialization in school, the
implications of Choo’s research assert that these venues enable a leap from simple school
yard delinquency to hardened gang life.61 Once inducted into the gang, the new member’s
activities range from drug selling, fighting, enforcement, extortion of local businesses,
muggings, robberies, etc. The older members tend to involve themselves in a leadership
decision making role and more complex crimes such as check and credit card crimes.
In summary, Choo’s research attests that the Korean American youth who join
gangs do so due to their acculturation process and identity formation as a result of
perceived discrimination, need for social unity, and high expectations placed on them by
parents. The identity crisis includes evidence of youth living a bipolar life and a growing
generational gap between parent and child expectations. These youth tend to organize
based on aforementioned factors, and become more indoctrinated into a world of violence
and crime due to the availability of venues and opportunities for action which they found
as they became more involved with delinquency and gang life.

61

Choo, K.-S. (2007). pg. 150

39

The chart listed illustrates Korean gang members from the group known only as
“Joong and his boys”. The framework highlights the patterns and observables of
acculturations stress experienced by the members of this group leading from delinquency
to radicalization to gang membership. This group was one of the primary focus groups of
Choo’s studies on Korean delinquent youth and gangs.

Table 6- Radicalization Process of Korean American Youth into Gang Member
Name

Nationality

Conversion
Observable

Motivation

Evidence of Acculturation
Stress / Lack of Integration

Opportunity for
Action /
Incubators

Charged
as Gang
Member

Joong &
His Boys

USA

-Increased
gang
observables

-Need for
social
inclusion as a
result of
perceived
discrimination

- Socially Isolated

-Training and
Indoctrination
to gang life
from peers
and older
gang
members.

N/A

-Conflict with
other gangs /
ethnic groups

-High expectations
placed by parents /
Family Issues,
Generational gap in
habits and behaviors.

- Radical
change in
behavior
-Engaged in
illicit activities

-Depression
- Perceived
discrimination

-Divergent world views
-Identity Problems:
“Twinkie” or “Fobbie” /

-Membership
in gang
groups
-Venues for
opportunity;
gang bars,
nightclubs,
etc.

-Bipolar life

The Case of Sami Osmakac: Jihad in Tampa Bay
Osmakac was arrested by Federal agents on January 7, 2012 in connection to a
potential terrorist attack against the city of Tampa. Agents from the Tampa Federal
Bureau of Investigation field office attested that the FBI had been watching Osmakac for
several months by posing as undercover radical jihadists sympathetic to Osmakac’s
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cause.62 Osmakac first came onto the FBI’s radar in September 2011 when it was
reported by a confidential human source (CHS) from inside the Tampa-St. Petersburg
Muslim community that a “young man was asking the CHS for flags used by Al Qaeda
on the battlegrounds of Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq”. The CHS directed Osmakac to an
undercover FBI agent who the source had an information sharing relationship. Osmakac
contacted the undercover agent who posed as a Jihadist willing to help him commit acts
of terrorism in Tampa.63
The CHS also provided the FBI with statements collected from local Islamic
leaders and the Mosque where Osmakac had attended. The concerns highlighted the
young man’s radical behavior shift, disaffected reality, and increasing aggressiveness.
For example, leaders at the Mosque claimed that Osmakac had become increasingly
hostile towards those he perceived as non-Muslim or who didn’t follow strict
interpretations of Islam and was asked to leave after violently confronting leaders in the
Muslim community.64
The undercover FBI agent posing as a Jihadist helped Osmakac in selecting
targets for the impending attack. These operations culminated in the undercover agent
supplying the young man with what Osmakac assumed to be a vehicle based improvised
explosive device (VBIED), a suicide belt rigged with explosives, and a multitude of
firearms (all of which had been rendered inoperable prior to the transaction by the
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undercover FBI agents).65 Osmakac willingly accepted these logistical supplies from the
agent and prepared for his day to attack the city.
Osmakac was arrested by Federal agents on January 7, 2012 in connection with
alleged plans for a homegrown terrorist style attack. His plan, according to the FBI, was
to set off explosives based in vehicles in the area known as Ybor City near downtown
Tampa; a popular area for residents and tourists. Osmakac also planned to take hostages
and use them as leverage in order to release Muslim political prisoners, and also target
law enforcement installations throughout the Tampa Bay area in an effort to avenge what
he perceived as “crimes against Muslims by the United States and to strike terror into his
victim’s hearts in Tampa”.66
Sami Osmakac was born in 1986 to a Muslim family in the secluded hamlet of
Lubizde, Kosovo of the former Yugoslavia where his father ran a small bakery. By the
1990s, violent ethnic clashes fueled in the region as the Yugoslavian state began to
disintegrate into chaos and anarchy as Serbs and Muslims fought for control. The
Lubizde area was heavily hit during the war and the Osmakac family, caught in the
whirlwind of the violence decided to leave their home and flee to safety, and seek a better
set of opportunities for their children, including 13 year old Sami. The family decided to
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immigrate to the West, moving first to Germany and later to the United States settling in
the quiet suburb of Pinellas Park, FL near the city of Tampa.67
Sami’s father set up his own bakery and grocery store selling traditional goods
and Balkan baked deserts to the community. The family was noted by neighbors and
extended family members as a “very good family, who were quiet and subtle, mostly
keeping to themselves”. Shock would later overtake the family and the greater Tampa
community as their son Sami, now a 25 year old man and naturalized citizen of the
United States would be arrested and charged as homegrown terrorist.
Assessing the radicalization of Sami Osmakac and identifying patterns which
concur to the previous research data listed in this thesis have been problematic at best in
identifying stressors which caused him to make the leap and execute an attack for two
main reasons. First, prior to his conviction, Osmakac or “Abdul Samia” (reported as one
of his many aliases) boasted streams of YouTube videos which declare his growing
inability to live in a world where Muslims are persecuted, and the kufr or infidels (to
include deviant Muslims) enjoy a free reign of lifestyles in what he considered a “life of
sin against God”.
Osmakac frequently identified groups who in his view offended God’s word to
include slanderous contempt of Jews and Christians living a life of sin.68 These videos
serve as an indicator of Osmakac’s life, but fail to assess the man before radicalization
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making these videos unable to provide insight into acculturation stressors. However, as
will be discussed later in this section, these videos do explain another factor critical to
this research in terms of the formation of a bipolar life in the West.
The second problem in evaluating Osmakac is the inability of his family to
express detailed references to his upbringing and events which may demonstrate evidence
of acculturation stressors and bipolar life. To this day, his family still refuses to
acknowledge the crimes their son is charged with or the radical behavioral shifts and
observables they witnessed. According to the family, “it is a concocted lie by Federal
authorities”.69 Therefore, the majority of data on Osmakac has come from previous high
school friends, news briefs, posted videos by Osmakac, and the commentary from
extended relatives which paint a picture of a worthy candidate for identifying patterns
associated with radicalization into a homegrown terrorist.
Sami Osmakac was not always so violent or radical. High school classmates
would describe Osmakac and the few friends he did associate with as loners with
testimonies claiming that Osmakac was an outcast.70 As he grew older, friends say
Osmakac begin to grow increasingly confrontational. Further accounts of his friends
include a particular recording sessions where Osmakac used to rap with his friends. On
one particular instance, Sami concluded a rap song with slogans about killing Jews and
setting off explosives. The lyrics of the song struck Sami’s friends as something “outside
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the realm of acceptance”.71 An additional confrontation with friends includes discussion
of religion. According to the friend, upon hearing a friend state that he was a Christian,
Osmakac reportedly laughed and began acting smug about it. These instances would be
one of many bringing his friends to start questioning his beliefs and further push him
away from socializing with him and bringing him closer towards radicalization and
highlighting his social isolation.72
In the summer of 2008, the Osmakac family returned to their hometown of
Labizde to visit family who remained in their hometown. The family began to return
regularly for summer trips to the country. Osmakac’s aunt would later recount to the
media following Osmakac’s arrest that she had began noting a particular change in Sami
Osmakac’s behavior over the last few years. As she explains, “Sami, who was now
growing a beard, donned only religious garments, and was frequently accompanied by
two devout Muslims from Albania and two from Bosnia. He also began to shun his
relatives during his trips to Kosovo much different from the Sami they had previously
known in his younger years.73
Osmakac’s last visit to Labizde in October 2011 seemed the most bizarre and
indicating that the Sami Osmakac’s they had previously known had radically changed.
Osmakac’s relatives had heard from neighbors that Sami had returned to Labizde, but did
not stop by and see his aunt or any relatives. Authorities in Kosovo who regularly
coordinate on terrorism related issues with the United States had been tracking Sami’s

73

Tampa Bay Times. (2012, Janurary 15). Tampa terror suspect grew distant, penned violent rap lyrics.
Retrieved October 2, 2012.
74
Tampa Bay Times. (2012, Janurary 15). Tampa terror suspect grew distant, penned violent rap lyrics.
Retrieved October 2, 2012.
75

Qena, N., & Lush, T. (2012, Janurary 14). Friends: Fla. Bomb Plot Suspect was Radical, Loner. Retrieved May 16,
2012, from CBS News Tampa: http://tampa.cbslocal.com/2012/01/14/friends-fla-bomb-plot-suspect-was-radical-loner/

45

activities in the country for some time. According to the Kosovo authorities, Osmakac
used this final visit as a venue to meet with other noted Islamic radicals in the area.74
The increased aggressiveness, social isolation, and confrontational attitude would
culminate into an assault charge filed by a Tampa-area activist; a Christian preacher from
the highly controversial Westboro Baptist Church. According to the charges, Osmakac
had been arguing with the Westboro Baptist Preacher over the legitimacy of the Islamic
religion outside a Lady Gaga concert. Osmakac became angry and lashed out; the activist
claimed Osmakac physically assaulted him causing minor physical damage. The
individual’s partner was able to record the event on video. Osmakac was later jailed on
charges that he head-butted and physically assaulted the man”.75
In terms of bipolar life Osmakac may have experienced prior to radicalization, the
inability and unwillingness of family members to describe in detail Sami’s upbringing
makes the identification of a possible patterns difficult to conclude. However, Osmakac
may have very well created his own version of bipolar life without his family’s inclusion.
The video stream which Osmakac proudly posted on YouTube illustrates a divergent
individual attempting to live in two distinct versions of the West; the first, being the
mainstream United States society where Sami Osmakac enjoyed rap music and the
second being the world where there was a “proper way for Muslims and moreover the
entire world population to live in accordance with the laws of God”.
In one particular video titled, O Muslims Fight Your Desires and Do Not Follow
Them! featured on YouTube, Osmakac boasts about the two different societies that
existed in his view; one of the Kufr or infidel and unbelievers and one of the true
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believers of God: the Muslims.76 The expressed notion of two different worlds this
individual observed is evidence for bipolar life and identity crisis suggesting that these
divergent existences where possible factors in his radicalization.
In conclusion, the case of Sami Osmakac serves as a clear example of
radicalization into a homegrown terrorist due to acculturation stressors, bipolar life, and
opportunity for actions he experienced ultimately leading to his transformation. Had
Osmakac succeeded in his attempts to set off these devices, it would have caused untold
damage and loss of life in Tampa Bay. Though FBI agents were able to identify Osmakac
before he could execute these attacks, it is clearly evident that all the signs were present.
The following framework details Osmakac’s radicalization patterns.

Table 7- Radicalization Process of Western Muslim Youth into Homegrown Terrorist

Name

Nationality

Conversion Type
(rejuvenated or
formal
conversion)

Motivation

Evidence of
Acculturation Stress
/ Lack of
Integration

Opportunity for
Action/
Incubators

Charged as
Homegrown
Terrorist

Sami
Osmakac

-USA

-Rejuvenated
conversion to
Islam

-Atrocities
against Muslims
in Iraq and
Afghanistan,
Kosovo

-Social Isolation

-Presumed
meetings with
Balkan based
Islamic
Radicals

Yes

Naturalized
Citizen
from the
former
Yugoslavia

-Increased
religious
observables
- Radical
changes in
behavior

-Perceived
Discrimination
-Family Issues

-Disgust at lives
of un-devout
Muslims and
Kufr.
-Potential war
trauma from
childhood

76

-Bipolar Life \
Muslim and Kufr
worlds.
-Identity Issues

-Internet
(YoutTube,
etc.)
-Mock
Training by
Undercover
Federal Agents
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The Case of Mohamed Merah: American vs. French Radicalization Patterns

During a Sunday afternoon on 11 March, 2012, a 30 year old French Airborne
Paratrooper Sgt. Imad Ibn-Ziaten was shot dead by an unknown gunman behind a French
school in a quiet district of Toulouse in southern France. Four days later in the town of
Montauban, France Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) captured the shooting of three
other uniformed French Paratroopers; 24 year old Corporal Abel Chennouf, 26 year old
Private Mohamed Legouad, and 28 year old Corporal Loic Liber. All three men were shot
at close range by the gunman as they stood in line to withdrawal money from an ATM
machine. Witnesses described the gunman as a small man wearing all black with a black
motorcycle helmet, who took his time to patiently reload a new magazine into his pistol
after shooting the three soldiers, turn over one of the wounded soldiers and shoot him
three more times screaming “Allah Akbar” or “God is Great” before fleeing on a
motorbike.77 Chennouf and Legouad were announced dead at the scene of the crime by
French authorities, while Liber remained severely wounded and in a comma.
Having no leads in the investigation as to who the gunman was or why the victims
were specifically targeted, French authorities began the largest manhunt in French history
for the suspected gunman. Four days later, the gunman struck again this time at the Ozar
Hatorah Jewish School in Toulouse. Witness statements suggested that the gunman wore
the same black clothing and motorcycle helmet and walked up to the gates of the school
and began firing wildly and indiscriminately at anything that moved.
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In the attack, the gunmen killed 30 year old Rabbi and teacher Jonathan Sandler
as well as his two sons Gabriel aged four, and Areih aged five. The final victim in the
rampage was the school’s headmaster seven year old daughter Myriam Monsonego who
was reportedly grabbed by the hair and shot dead at close range by the gunman.78 As the
gunmen fled, witnesses reported that the suspect had taken the time to switch weapons
from a 9mm to a .45 caliber handgun and had filmed the entire attack through a mounted
video camera on his helmet. Police, the French community, and the world were stunned
by the barbarism. French authorities still had little evidence to conduct an investigation
other than the gunman used two handguns, wore black, and road a motorcycle.
Authorities were given their first clue on the gunman’s identity by a Toulouse mechanic
who received a series of strange questions from a patron asking “how it was possible to
disable the anti-theft GPS system on a Yamaha T-MAX motorbike” the same model used
as a getaway vehicle in the attacks.
The second clue came from Ibn-Zaiten’s email inbox. According to the emails,
Ibn-Zaiten had been advertising the sale of his motor scooter online and an “interested
party” wanted to set up a meeting with him to purchase the bike behind a school in
Toulouse where he was gunned down. In one of the emails, Ibn Zaiten had identified his
employment as a French paratrooper which struck police as a possible motive for the
murder.
The “interested party’s” email address and server profile led two French police
officers to an address at a Toulouse apartment complex. After knocking on the apartment
door for several minutes, a barrage of bullets were discharged by someone inside the
apartment. The rounds penetrated the door wounding the two police officers. French
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authorities had found the gunman responsible for the atrocities in southern France. He
was a 23 year old French citizen of Algerian descent named Mohemed Merah.79
A mass mobilization of French authorities quickly descended on the apartment
complex in the Toulouse suburb. The elite RAID police commando units began
negotiations with Merah to surrender peacefully. As he hid in his apartment, Merah
regularly exchanged volleys of rounds with police from time to time. Merah reportedly
used a variety of weapons he had stock piled to include not only the two pistols used in
the attacks, but also an AK-47 assault rifle and an UZI 9mm machine gun.80 After 32
hours of failed negotiations, RAID commandos entered the apartment in order to subdue
Merah. Media crews on the scene captured the ensuing gun battle between the suspect
and police, reminiscent of a foreign battleground in Afghanistan or Iraq. Merah in the
shootout attempted to escape, by jumping out of an apartment balcony, firing his weapon
wildly, only to be shot dead by a police marksman.81 On March 22, after nearly two
weeks of panic, carnage, and terror which gripped the country, Mohamed Merah, the
homegrown terrorist, was dead and charged posthumously with murder and terrorism by
French authorities.
The following investigation of Merah’s death by French authorities discovered the
videos Merah had taken while executing his attacks against the Jewish school. The films
also included derogatory rhetoric about the involvement of French forces in Afghanistan,
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the suffering of Palestinian children at the hands of the Israelis, and the French instituted
ban on Muslim women wearing the full faced veil in public. Further controversy from the
French public came when it was announced that Merah had been on the radar of French
authorities and intelligence services for some time.82 The investigation also discovered
that Merah had traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan where he claims he met and trained
with Taliban and Al Qaeda militants. According to Merah, he was able to execute these
attacks on behalf of the Al Qaeda leadership.83
Though deceased, the background information available on Merah is widely
available and points to a young man caught between two very distinct lives in France. He
was seen as a loner, who suffered from social isolation, identity crisis, and most likely
perceived discrimination and depression. The majority of data sources come from friends,
extended family, and neighbors who express Merah was by no means an “ideal” type for
terrorist radicalization and was by all accounts undistinguishable.84 However, further
examination indicates the signs were overtly apparent that Merah contained all the
necessary ingredients to become radicalized.
Merah was born on October 10, 1988 in the French suburbs of Toulouse to a
Muslim French father and Algerian mother and grew up in the suburbs of Izards. Like
most children in the banlieues or French suburbs known for their relative socioeconomic
disparity and high immigrant populations, Merah, his parents and his four other siblings
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lived a relatively quiet life despite the poverty, low-employment opportunities, and minor
scrapes with the law.85
At age five, Merah’s parents divorced and his biological father would later return
to Algeria in 2008. His mother would later be remarried to Sabri Essid, “a member of a
Toulouse terror network that tried to recruit fighters in France to join the ranks of al
Qaeda in Iraq against US and coalition forces. Essid was later convicted in a French court
in 2009 after being detained in Syria in 2006 where he was running an al Qaeda safe
house”.86 It is believed by French authorities, that Essid may have been the first of many
influences to expose Merah to radical Islam.
At age 17, Merah was noted by French authorities as being a poor student in
school and having consistent run-ins with the police for small offences such as vandalism
and petty theft. Despite his record with the law, friends would describe Merah even after
his death that the young man was quiet and respectful and enjoyed soccer, motorbikes,
and cars. He did not express any interest in Islam or politics.87 Merah would later be
expelled from school and enrolled in a vocational training center where he began a career
as an automotive mechanic in Toulouse.
In 2007, Merah was sentenced to prison for 18 months after violently mugging an
elderly women in Toulouse. French chief prosecutor of Paris François Milons, believes
that during his prison sentence, Merah was exposed to and embraced Salafist political
Islam. For Merah, prison served as an incubator for his radicalization. After his release in
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2008, Merah would declare to family members that he had rediscovered Islam after
having largely ignoring his family’s faith during his upbringing. Merah began to show
radical behavioral changes in his appearance including shifting styles of “wearing
military fatigues one day to high end fashion the next. He reportedly became obsessed
with violent online videos depicting beheadings and torture”.88
The event of Merah being exposed to Salafist ideology during his time in prison is
an interesting component to the examination of radicalized individuals and will most
likely become a booming consideration in the future study of homegrown terrorism. In
the case of prison radicalization, the FBI asserts, “prisons literally provide a captive
audience of disaffected young men (and women) easily influenced by charismatic
extremist leaders. These inmates, mostly minorities, feel that the United States has
discriminated against them or against minorities and Muslims overseas. This perceived
oppression, combined with a limited knowledge of Islam, makes this population
vulnerable for extremists looking to radicalize and recruit”.89
The idea of prisons becoming opportunities for action or incubators to recruit and
radicalize potential homegrown terrorists is best exemplified by Gillo Pontecarvo’s 1966
film The Battle for Algiers. The film portrays colonial Algeria under the rule of Gaullist
France in the early 1950s. The storyline depicts a burgeoning and tense bipolar society in
Algeria where two versions of the country exist. One a society where French settlers to
the North African country known as pied-noirs tend to enjoy a life of primacy and luxury
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in the European quarter of the city of Algiers, and the other a society of the native
Algerian Arab population who are subjected to neglect, oppression, and humiliation
while confined to the much more economically poor Casbah quarter of the city.
It is at this time in the film that we meet the story’s protagonist Ali La Pointe; a
young, illiterate Algerian Arab “street hustler” and labeled juvenile delinquent. La Pointe,
is consistently growing disaffected and hostile toward the Pied-noirs who he views as the
source of his problems. While running from a policeman for a petty crime in the
European quarter of Algiers, he is tripped by a group of French youths and retaliates by
physically assaulting one of them landing him in prison.90
While in prison Ali La Ponte witnesses a member of the Algerian Arab resistance
group known as the National Liberation Front (FLN) which advocates for an end to
French imperialism in Algeria and the establishment of a united Algerian country based
on Islamic principles. The FLN member is brutally executed by the French authorities via
the guillotine; however his impact on La Pointe is life changing. Following the execution,
it can be easily interpreted by the viewer that La Pointe has found a new, blossoming
identity and a reason for living. He has found purpose and solace in a group dedicated to
something bigger than himself; nationalism through Islamic inspired terrorism and
advocated violence against the French colonialists.
This execution and exposure to the FLN mission allows La Pointe to gain not only
a sense of identity, but an outlet for his anger and disaffection toward the authorities and
French Pied-noirs who have disenfranchised him throughout his entire life. La Pointe is
essentially transformed from this induction to the FLN ideology from Simple Street
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criminal to radical. This can be exemplified following his release from prison when he
begins to notice the dual or bipolar Algerian societies in terms of economic well being
and opportunities. La Pointe begins working for the FLN as an assassin, executing
informants and police officers for their role in the Occupation of Algeria. Eventually, La
Pointe becomes a fully fledged militant hero against the French army before he is killed
in action.91
The events depicted in Pontecarvo’s film illustrates that a young, disaffected,
oppressed youth living in a bipolar society can easily become radicalized in prison and
become more prone to engaging in acts of terrorism as prisons essentially create a ripe
environment and incubate potential radicals.92 In the West, cases like La Pointe and
Merah indicates that the potential exists for more disaffected young men and women to
radicalize in prison as a way to cope with their bipolar lives in society, gain identity, and
discover an outlet for their frustrations against the authorities they blame for their dismal
existence and problems. In future research on the study of homegrown terrorism, prisons
and studies of former prisoners may become the next top incubator of concern for
authorities and should not be discounted.
Following his release from prison, Merah attempted to commit suicide on
Christmas day. He was ordered to a psychiatric facility for 10 days and later referred by
French medical authorities to psychiatrist Alain Penin who cited Merah as having
“normal intellect but a disposition toward anti-social behavior”. Penin also noted that
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Merah was “courteous, correct, and talkative young man” fitting in with statements made
by Merah's friends who said he was "calm, gentle and loved by everyone". 93
However, Penin also cited Merah’s dark behavioral side. According to Penin,
“Merah made statements such as "I like to sit in my corner," and that he had claimed to
have severed connections with the bad company he was keeping and didn't want to see
anyone.94 After his release from the hospital, Merah found little chances for employment
following his incarceration in prison and the psychiatric institution. Merah attempted to
join the French army and later the French Foreign Legion, but due to his criminal and
psychological record, his application was denied.
In 2010, he was accused by a Muslim family in his neighborhood for snatching a
young man off the street and forcing him to watch violent beheadings in Afghanistan on
the internet. Merah’s mother supposedly reported the event as well as her growing
concern about the radical change she saw in her son’s behavior, but according to her
statement to the media “police do not care about assaults of Arabs against Arabs”.95
Following the assault, Merah left France and travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan in
order to join Taliban and Al Qaeda militants. He returned to Afghanistan in 2011, but the
trip was cut short due to his contraction of hepatitis A. Upon his return in October 2011,
he was questioned by French domestic intelligence services about his travels to the
region, but due to lack of evidence, he was released.96
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The aspects of bipolar life in the case of Mohmed Merah are less easy to indicate
due to the limited information about his upbringing inside his home in Izards and
Toulouse. While it is noted that some of his family members were extremely religious,
there is little evidence that this affected Merah personally as he was a frequent patron of
nightclubs, bars, and more over lived an ideal life of a 23 year old French youth.
However, the examination of the bipolarized life Merah may be found in the
socioeconomic plight of French citizens of North African descent living in the French
suburbs.
France is home to the largest Muslim community in the European Union
constituting 6 million Muslims or 10 percent of the population. However, the banlieues
or suburbs of France where most of the Muslim community lives is far from the posh
lifestyles of the postcard picture of Paris and the Champs d’lyse. These suburbs in France
are well noted by the society as containing the majority of immigrants to France as well
as high levels of abject poverty and socioeconomic disparity. This division between the
greater French high society and the residents who live in these suburbs has in essence
segregated and alienated these citizens from the French larger society.
The social and economic conditions of the banlieues deliver little hope to the
impoverished citizens (particularly the youth) at the chance for upward social mobility as
the rate of unemployment amongst the young men of these areas is as high as 40
percent.97 With little opportunities for work, the banlieues are an epicenter for boredom
as severely underfunded state programs in the local school and community centers
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continues the cycle of disparity among the residents as these areas become even more
disconnected from mainstream French society.98
These satellite communities and closed knit groups who reside in these areas have
effectively produced “two distinct versions of France”; one version featuring high posh
lifestyle living in relative security and another where French authorities seldom intervene
to provide citizens basic social services. What has been produced in this absence of
authority are the establishments of parallel institutions such as private schools, religious
centers, clubs, and other associations which breed contemptuous ideals toward the French
society leading many French Muslim youths toward extremism.99
French residents in these areas also claim this segregation is due to the high rates
of discrimination against French citizens of Arab or North African descent. Residents in
these communities have long complained that police single them out for identity checks
and arrest. For example, a 2007 independent study by social experts confirmed “French
police widely use ethnic profiling as a tactic of stop, search, and arrest of those perceived
as being of immigrant origin”.100 Though it has never been cited, it is safe to assume in
accordance with Merah’s constant run-ins with the law that he very well had been
subjected to these profiling and molded by these contemptuous institutions; exacerbating
his bipolarized world, identity crisis, and perceived discrimination.
In conclusion, the attacks, planned, orchestrated, and executed by French
homegrown terrorist Mohamed Merah illustrate a clear cut case of acculturation stressors,
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bipolar life, identity crisis, and discrimination. Unlike previous cases addressed in this
research, Merah was able to achieve his intended goals and strike terror into the French
society. Additionally, Merah’s case illustrates that the patterns associated with
acculturation stress and bipolar life are not solely reserved to one particular Western
country. The chart listed cites Merah’s radicalization patterns.

Table 8- Radicalization Process of Western Muslim Youth into Homegrown Terrorist

Name

Nationality

Conversion Type
(rejuvenated or
formal conversion)

Motivation

Evidence of
Acculturation Stress
/ lack of Integration

Opportunity
for Action /
Incubators

Charged as
Homegrown
Terrorist

Mohamed
Merah

French
(Algerian
Descent)

-Rejuvenated
conversion to
Islam

-Atrocities
against Muslims
in Palestine and
French
involvement in
Afghanistan

-Social Isolation

-Internet

Yes

-Perceived
Discrimination

-Travel to
Pakistan and
Afghanistan
to train with
militants

-French
involvement in
Muslim citizen’s
affairs i.e. French
ban on veil.

-Identity Issues

-Increased
religious
observables
- Radical
changes in
behavior

- bipolar life

-Depression
-Family Issues
-Bipolar Life
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Conclusion and Findings
The traits and patterns associated with the theory of acculturation stress symptoms
and bipolar life clearly support the hypothesis that a “lack of integration” into a society
will cause some Western youth to radicalize and in some cases commit violent acts of
terrorism. Though each candidate in the list of case studies may have differed from
motivation to nationality to opportunities for action, the research concludes that
acculturation stress, bipolar life and lack of integration were all found in each case. The
chart below singles out this category by each case studied.
Table 9- Patterns of Acculturation Stress / Bipolar Life / Lack of Integration by Case

Joong and His Boys (USA)








Socially Isolated
Perceived
Discrimination
High expectations
placed by parents /
Family Issues,
Generational gap in
habits and behaviors.
Bipolar Life ,
generational gap
Depression
Identity Problems

Sami Osmakac (USA)






Social Isolation
Perceived
Discrimination
Family Issues, shunning
relatives
Bipolar Life, Muslim
and Kufr worlds.
Identity Issues

Mohamed Merah (FR)








Social Isolation
Perceived
Discrimination
Bipolar Life,
French
segregated
societies
Family Issues,
divorce
Identity Issues
Depression

The findings from each of the case studies detail a pattern of steps each individual
or group took before completing the radicalization process, and executing an attack or
60

joining into a violent crime organization. The research concludes that bipolar life and
discrimination had a major factor in all three cases. For example, the Korean American
youths turned gang members and Sami Osmakac all listed the divergent societies they
lived in as reasons for joining violent groups or choosing to execute violent attacks.
Merah, on the other hand, never commented on the segregated French societies noted in
Thachuck, Marion, and Richardson’s work on the study of homegrown terrorist in the
suburbs of France. However, it is safe to assume and consistent from other research on
French citizens of Arab or North African descent that these factors were ever apparent in
his run-ins with French police and socioeconomic problems he experienced in Toulouse
and Izards.
The pattern of social isolation also tended to play a deep part in the radicalization
of these groups and individuals. Each cited that they either turned to these lifestyles as a
result of feeling “lonely” or outside social inclusion. Merah and Osmakac were
previously noted as being “loners” with few friends to speak of or kept to themselves
most of the time. Joong and his boys tended to describe themselves as loners prior to
joining the group as a need to become involved into a collected peer social network as a
result of this isolation, identity crisis, and discrimination they all claimed to have
experienced.
The family issues pattern found in each of these cases is problematic due to the
limited findings and forthcomings of these individuals’ parents. Due to the nature of the
lifestyles, their children seceded to as well as the crimes they were accused of, or charged
with committing is an emotional and hot-button subject to say the least. However, in each
case, family issues were cited such as divorce, generational gaps of understanding of
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behaviors and habits, and high expectations were apparent in each individual prior to
radicalization.
Finally, the acculturation stressor of depression was noted in examination of
Korean American youth and the case of Mohamed Merah, but was not cited in the case of
Sami Osmakac’s radicalization. The reasons for this lack of insight into Osmkac’s
psychological status at the time of radicalization and preparation for conducting the
attacks may result from two causes. First, Merah as well as Joong and his boys were
assessed by certified psychiatrists and scholars who are able to levy such a diagnosis. For
example, Choo used his understanding of the high expectations placed on Korean
American youths to exceedingly perform in relation to the amount of these youths who
“get burned out or depressed with school and life”. Merah was evaluated by a French
psychological institution who labeled him with depression and anti-social behavior.
The second possibility is that though there is evidence that Osmakac stated to
federal authorities that “he was ready to die” and that once he had a suicide explosive
belt, “they [law enforcement] could take him in five million pieces” a complete
psychological profile of the individual has yet to be released by authorities.101 Though
Osmkac’s testimony paints the picture of a depressed individual, until references of
reputable credentials can be found in regards to his mental health; his pattern of
depression cannot be noted in this study.
As stated previously in this thesis, FBI Director Robert Mueller acknowledged
that the threat from homegrown terrorism may have evolved to include “extremists from
a diverse set of backgrounds, geographic locations, life experiences, and motivating
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factors.”102 It is the hope and desire of this M.A. student of Political Science, that the
examined research may help organizations like the Counter Terrorism units in the FBI,
DHS, etc, to develop a new framework for evaluating and indicating potential
homegrown terrorist before they radicalize.
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